Love and caring (Frankfurt)?

What is the difference between caring and wanting for Frankfurt?

Discussion: Wanting to do what is best for Elise is a first-order desire, but caring for Frankfurt is a second-order desire, something he often calls a volition. To have a volition is very different than having a first-order desire.

What is love according to Harry Frankfurt?

Frankfurt goes on to explain that the most important form of caring is love, a nonvoluntary, disinterested concern for the flourishing of what is loved. And he contends that the purest form of love is self-love.

How does Frankfurt See self-love morality?

Because who or what one loves is not grounded in any objective value or good, Frankfurt argues that genuine self-love is compatible with loving what is bad, what is evil. What makes self-love genuine in part for him is wholeheartedness.

What concept of love does Nozick offer?

Nozick (1989) offers a union view that differs from those of Scruton, Fisher, and Solomon in that Nozick thinks that what is necessary for love is merely the desire to form a “we,” together with the desire that your beloved reciprocates.

What does Frankfurt mean by the will?

will: a first-order desire which is effective, i.e. that causes one to do what one desires to do. A desire to eat a bag of potato chips is one’s will, in Frankfurt’s sense, if that desire brings one to actually eat the bag of potato chips.

What does Frankfurt mean by first order desire?

Frankfurt identifies a person’s will with their effective desires. Second: Distinguish, amongst your desires, between first order desires and second order desires. A first order desire is a desire for anything other than a desire; a second order desire is a desire for a desire.

What is it to love oneself on Frankfurt account?

Frankfurt argues that the purest form of love is self-love. This sounds perverse, but self-love — as distinct from self-indulgence — is at heart a disinterested concern for whatever it is that the person loves. The most elementary form of self-love is nothing more than the desire of a person to love.

What does Frankfurt mean by Wholeheartedness?

In response, Frankfurt introduced the notion of “wholeheartedness.” He claims we constitute our “selves” by wholeheartedly endorsing some desires and rejecting others (“Identification” 170).

What is selfless love?

When you love someone selflessly, it means that you are willing to love them even if they don’t love you back or treat you the way that other people do. You should be willing to put your feelings aside and ignore any rude behavior because love is something we give freely not selfishly.

What is a Frankfurt example?

Frankfurt’s examples involve agents who are intuitively responsible for their behavior even though they lack the freedom to act otherwise. Here is a typical case: Suppose someone (Black, let us say) wants Jones to perform a certain action.

What does Frankfurt argue about?

Frankfurt makes the point that a person who is unable to do otherwise should sometimes still be morally responsible for his actions even though he had no other alterna- tive. I firmly believe, even in my example of X, that one does not bear moral responsibil- ity because one does not have the ability to do otherwise.

What is a Frankfurt style case?

ABSTRACT. Frankfurt-Style Cases (FSCs) seem to elicit the intuitive judgment that an agent is morally responsible despite being unable to act otherwise, which is supposed to falsify the Principle of Alternative Possibility (PAP).

What does Frankfurt say about moral responsibility?

Frankfurt 1969): Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP): a person is morally responsible for what she has done only if she could have done otherwise. Although its precise form and interpretation have varied, this principle has enjoyed broad support in the history of philosophy.

What does Frankfurt claim about freedom?

What is Frankfurt’s account of freewill? It is in virtue of the fact that a person can have volitions of the second order that she is capable of having free will. Freedom of the will is not simply a matter of just being able to do what one wants to do.

What does Frankfurt have to say about what it is that makes the actions of a person freely done?

A person’s act is free if and only if that person could have done otherwise. The natural thought is that if fatalism is true, that means that no one ever could have done otherwise; and therefore that, given the principle of alternate possibilities, no one ever acts freely.

How does Frankfurt distinguish first and second order desires?

Higher order desires sometimes called volitions are desires about other desires specifically second order desires are about first order desires. Third order desires are about second-order desires. And

What does Frankfurt mean by second order volition?

In Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person, Harry Frankfurt put forward a theory that what is essential to be a person is second-order volition. The notion of second-order volition can be used as a key conceptual tool in understanding the conflict between desires.

What is second order desire?

Second-order volition are desires about desires, or to desire to change the process, the how, of desiring. Examples would be desires to want to own a new car; to want to meet the pope; or to want to quit drinking alcohol permanently.

What are second order preferences?

A second-order preference is a preference over preferences. This paper addresses the role that second-order preferences play in a theory of instrumental rationality. I argue that second-order preferences have no role to play in the prescription or evaluation of actions aimed at ordinary ends.

What are laundered preferences?

The basic idea behind ‘laundering preferences’ is that, while preferences will sometimes be problematic and cannot be ‘trusted’ (as discussed above), if certain conditions are met, preferences will be reliable indicators of what makes people’s lives go well—that is, their well-being.

What is a second order inclination?

second order inclination. we desire to have a certain inclination– we want to have a desire, but where the desire isn’t particularly strong.